[Politics] Understanding The White House's Middle East Strategy

In the June 2007 issue of The Atlantic, David Samuels takes an behind-the-scenes look at the strategy and ideaology behind Condoleeza Rice's State Department and how it informs the Bush administrations course in dealing with the Middle East. The article, "Grand Illusions," is not available online (except for this excerpt) without a subscription, but it is a very insightful and fascinating read.

For one thing, it is even handed and draws on many analysts and peers to comment on how effective they believe Condi and Bush's ideas can be. It makes very clear, that, at this point, Rice, more than anyone else in the administration, represents Bush's ideology most faithfully. It also gives the reader a good sense of how the administration views the cohesiveness of its Middle East strategy while using such disparate methods for different problems in the region.

I think one of the more fascinating insights is about Rice's passionate optimism that democracy can and will transform the region. There is no doubt that part of that optimism stems from a religious sensibility, from the idea that progress is inevitable, but it is also her passion for the transformative power of democracy that remind us about the leaps and bounds it has made in the past. She sums that up best when she aks, "Not that long ago–say, 1946– would anybody have said that France and Germany would never go to war again? Anyone?"

It is ironic because the duality between our most idealistic desires and those most fearful outcomes often seem to amount to what many see as this administration's bungling of its Middle East strategy. Rice was one of those that adamantly insisted that democratic elections be held in Palestine, much against the wishes of Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas among many others. To her, it was "the right thing," and yet it resulted in the election of Hamas to majority of the Palestinian Parliament.

In dealing with Iran, the strategy has been quite different, as more covert tactics, such as providing logistical support to liberal Iranian factions, have been employed as means of routing out the extremist leadership. And this method stands in stark contrast to Iraq where a full military invasion was used in an effort to foster democracy.

In my opinion (and I think in the view of the article as well) the administration has been blinded by its optimism. In a way, it is profoundly American for such optimism to guide us. And it is traditionally a very liberal belief that democratic rights should be provided at all costs. In that sense, liberals should feel a bit uneasy about their view of the administration's Middle East policy because that policy is rooted in the idea that liberal democracy is righteous.

So we are caught between a rock and a hard place. The idealogues that have mismanaged this war in a way represent the exact same things George Washington did: a universal ideology of liberal democracy that does not recognize the subjectivity of ethnic experience. We are caught between believing in the righteousness of liberalism and democracy, and recognizing the unique perspective and experience that informs the Middle East conscience and prevent it from being influenced by such righteous politics.

Rice believes what we'd all like to believe, and really what Western thought from 1789 to 1989 have taught us. But in the 21st century, one of the most imperative revelations we must have is that democracy, self-determination and the will of the people are three very different things, far beyond their semantics. Without that realization we are left in an endless strategy of political improvisation.